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Richard Saltman suggests that solidarity, a cherished notion at the heart of West European health care systems is
being reconsidered in the light of today’s austere economic conditions. Solidarity, he argues, has always been a
flexible moral guideline, one that allows for policy responses, such as limitations on health benefits or increased
out of pocket payments, that challenging fiscal conditions are said to demand. Here we consider what the basic
elements in solidarity – universality, redistribution, and uniformity– mean in health as compared to other social
policy realms such as pensions. Traditionally, the commitment to solidarity said little about the contents of services,
but the latter is perhaps subject to increasing scrutiny under the health policy microscope. Saltman is right to
emphasize the conceptual and cross-national flexibility of solidarity, but the notion retains a solid and durable core
that continues to give valuable direction to policymakers in search of acceptable strategies and structures for
decision making.
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Richard Saltman suggests that solidarity, a cherished no-
tion at the heart of West European health care systems
is being reconsidered in the light of today’s austere eco-
nomic conditions. Solidarity, he argues, has always been
a flexible moral guideline, one that allows for policy re-
sponses, such as limitations on health benefits or in-
creased out of pocket payments, that challenging fiscal
conditions are said to demand. Here we consider what
the basic elements in solidarity – universality, redistribu-
tion, and uniformity– mean in health as compared to
other social policy realms such as pensions. Tradition-
ally, the commitment to solidarity said little about the
contents of services, but the latter is perhaps subject to
increasing scrutiny under the health policy microscope.
Saltman is right to emphasize the conceptual and cross-
national flexibility of solidarity, but the notion retains a
solid and durable core that continues to give valuable
direction to policymakers in search of acceptable strat-
egies and structures for decision making.Commentary
Few would deny that ideological dogma is hard to banish
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medium, provided the original work is proper
creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/many may be surprised by Richard Saltman’s [1] conten-
tion that the sainted notion of solidarity is increasingly
used to rule out, peremptorily and a priori, changes in
health care coverage, benefits, and financing that aim to
keep health care systems sustainable–no small task amid
the hard, austerian times that now beset Western econ-
omies. Saltman argues skillfully that appeals to solidarity
as an all-purpose rejoinder to attempts to constrain the
growth of health care budgets is not only ill-advised but
also ahistorical and myopic. In fact, he contends, soci-
eties purportedly devoted to solidarity have often de-
parted from its presumed precepts, and in practice the
content of the concept varies widely among societies
and within societies over time.
Our comments here take issue less with his arguments
than with his emphases: by treating solidarity mainly as
a polemical encumbrance to grappling with the fiscal
threats Western health care systems face, he obscures
important parts of the policy picture. Moreover, the trio of
nations he picks for discussion have three features—unu-
sually long lags in embracing fully universal coverage, reli-
ance on sickness funds for coverage, and a commitment to
market forces (regulated competition) as a source of effi-
ciency—that not only set them off from many Western
peers (especially ones with single payer systems) but also
entail distinct challenges to and complications in the def-
inition and attainment of solidarity.cess article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
ly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://
) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Brown and Chinitz Israel Journal of Health Policy Research  (2015) 4:27 Page 2 of 5Contemplating the picture he sketches, one wonders
whether solidarity is all variation and no (or very little)
theme, whether there is any “there” there after all? The
question is as much symbolic as it is ontological. Any
health care policy, or change therein, may be examined
from the philosophical high ground of justice or (and
perhaps as) fairness and judged on criteria of equity
and/or equality. What, if anything, does “solidarity”
bring to the analytical party? Is it merely a political slo-
gan, a rhetorical interloper, posing as a profundity but
better suited to perplex than to guide policymakers? We
contend that the term is most usefully approached not
as a “criterion,” still less an “indicator” of good policy,
but rather as an interpretive gloss on the goodness (just-
ice, fairness, equity, and so on) of policy, what Blumer
[2] called a “sensitizing concept.”
As Saltman points out, in the late 19th century soli-
darity meant a sense of fellow-feeling, of fraternity,
which came to be extended into voluntary arrangements
for mutual aid (e.g. the French “mutualites”). Solidarity
initially connoted reciprocity among and on behalf of
lower-earning workers, for whom illness could mean loss
of jobs and incomes, a devastating outcome against
which spreading risk and pooling resources offered pro-
tection. As the capacities of medical care grew and the
costs of securing reliable care for a growing range of
conditions rose, the scope of reciprocity expanded: “we”
(meaning all citizens) are vulnerable, perishable, and in
need of social support, but the smaller the pool of risks
and resources, the harder this generalized reciprocity is
to design and sustain. Voluntary arrangements could not
achieve sufficient scale and durability so government be-
came the vehicle of solidarity, and the scope of the “soli-
darity community” spread beyond the working classes to
all citizens (a trend accelerated after World War II by
the insistence of various international bodies that health
care is a human right). In the years between the late
19th and the mid 20th centuries, then, the reach of soli-
darity as a normative guide to health care policy moved
beyond the worker to the citizen and beyond the
community to the nation.
Saltman seems to argue that, as a goal of and guide to
health policy, solidarity is a concept with an infirm and
shifting core, whereas we see it as a notion with a solid
core within (in Wittgenstein’s term) “blurred edges.”
Three ingredients constitute that core. The first is uni-
versality of coverage and access for all citizens and legal
residents, though not necessarily those who can, or
choose to, arrange private coverage (a rare exception,
but one that appears in two or Saltman’s three vignettes,
one being the Netherlands, which until recently
exempted its top third of earners from the national
health insurance system, and the other Germany, which
continues to exempt the highest earners and civilservants from its system of NHI). The second element is
redistribution: intrinsic to solidarity are cross-subsidies
from the better off, the healthier, the younger (and so
on) to the poorer, the sicker, and the aged. The third
basic feature is uniformity: everyone in the system of
coverage should be able to access the system of care on
more or less equal terms, which means in practice that
care should be allocated solely on the basis of medical
need. (In Germany, for example, the concept of solidar-
ity as codified in law entails the pooling of contributions
and expenses without regard to individual or sex-specific
risk assessments; means-tested contributions by which
better off participants support the less well off; and sup-
port for participants with dependents by those who have
none [3]).
Health care is not, of course, the sole venue in the wel-
fare state in which solidarity looms large. In France, for
example, “social security” contains other regimes—re-
tirement benefits (pensions), family allowances, un-
employment benefits, and benefits for occupational
injuries–besides health care, all of which are expected to
honor solidarity. But the application of this “principle”
to (say) pensions is much more straightforward than is
the case for health care. Universality means, in essence,
that all workers who had retirement contributions ex-
tracted from their paychecks over their career get bene-
fits. Redistribution is achieved by giving some retirees
benefits of substantially greater monetary value than the
contributions they made. And the terms, timing, and
amount of benefits are spelled out uniformly by law. Is-
sues can and do arise: should the best off receive pay-
ments they do not really “need”? Should benefits be
larger or smaller, awarded earlier or later? These deci-
sions are made and revised differently among nations
and within nations over time. But it is not especially
hard to identify and explicate the solidaristic core of
pension policy.
Health care policy poses distinctly different challenges.
In this case, universality means not that a check is reli-
ably in the mail but that all citizens can get the various
medical services they may need over the course of their
lives as needs arise. Solidarity insists that no citizens
should have trouble accessing the system (or affording
the services they received) for financial or other reasons
unrelated to need. Universality of coverage follows from
universal vulnerability to illness. (Even in the US, the
most obdurate opponents of universal coverage insist
that those who lack coverage can still get care, back-
handedly conceding the moral claim of universality.) In
pension policy beneficiaries are entitled to a sum of
money; in health care they are entitled to enter the mul-
tiple systems (financing, delivery, and so on) that define
how health services play out in distinct clinical
circumstances.
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jacket: for example, cost sharing and copayments, can-
not be condemned a priori as unsolidaristic. These mea-
sures tend to be accompanied by exemptions—for the
disabled, the aged, children, pregnant women, veterans,
and others—that redistribute their impact. Citizens pay
for their health care coverage and care in taxes (payroll,
income, sales, and other) and by trading off increases in
wages and salaries, and solidarity demands that these
payments be calibrated to ability to pay. Absent more
detail (for example, about the groups for which cost
sharing charges are waived or reduced) and more con-
text (in nations in strained financial circumstances per-
haps sizable cost sharing is required to sustain basic
health coverage and care for all citizens) one cannot
judge whether, and how far, eye-popping figures (for ex-
ample, the 37.4% cost sharing that Saltman cites in
Latvia) offend solidarity [4].
As for redistribution, solidarity spotlights the propos-
ition that coverage and access can be universal only if
cross-subsidies flow from the more advantaged to the
less advantaged. This is what equity entails, indeed
denotes– at least in Europe. (In the US a sizable body of
opinion seems to believe the reverse, namely, that good
health risks deserve to get good health insurance rates.)
Those transfers sustain coverage (that is, entry into the
system), but the contents of coverage (what is in the
benefit package and what providers deliver) is another
matter. With pensions, everyone gets a floor and the re-
sources they enjoy beyond that floor depend on lifetime
earnings, investment strategies, spending habits, and so
forth. In health care too everyone gets a floor—access to
medically necessary and appropriate care—but the con-
struction of the floor differs with clinical need as defined
by medical providers. Traditionally, the commitment to
solidarity has said little or nothing about the contents of
services, and the type of adjustments in the coverage or
provision of one or another service that Saltman de-
scribes usually have been relatively obscure or carried
out implicitly and thus have not been felt as a challenge
to or a “reduction” [1] of solidarity. Solidarity, then, has
been understood not as a mandate for any particular set
of benefits or services but rather as systematic cross-
subsidization of entry into a system in which what is
medically necessary and appropriate remains to be deter-
mined. Increasingly, however, concerned observers con-
tend that some systems are seeking to set explicit limits
to health benefits in ways that sacrifice solidarity for
cost containment.
In pension policy uniformity is easy: everyone meeting
simple criteria (age, contribution, and so on) gets paid.
Not so health care: everyone gets (or can get) care, but
not everyone can expect to get every possibly beneficial
clinical service. Systems of universal coverage havealways recognized the need for limits, which need, of
course, grows only more salient under the pressure of
relentless medical innovation. In France, this recognition
long ago led to the “ticket moderateur,” (copayments
intended to “moderate” consumption of care) and in
England to gatekeeping (the requirement that patients
must see their general practitioner before visiting a spe-
cialist). Because services that threaten the financial sus-
tainability of the system are not generalizable (that is,
appropriate to be uniformly on offer), one should be
cautious about characterizing denial of or limitations in
coverage of such services as reducing solidarity with one
or another group.
Is this type of rationing inherently antisolidaristic?
Some nations—for example, England and Israel—say no
explicitly and unapologetically. All systems have proce-
dures for assessing new technologies, and solidarity is
usually a central and explicit consideration in their deci-
sions. (On the importance of solidarity in setting prior-
ities in Germany’s Institute of Quality and Efficiency in
Health Care [IQWIG] see Katharina Kieslich [5]). But
how decisions are reached and enforced varies with rules
governing coverage and payment, demands and prefer-
ences of consumers, judgments by providers, supply side
considerations (number of specialists, beds, and so on),
and availability of alternatives (for instance, palliative
and hospice care instead of protracted hospital stays).
Societies work out these matters (which is to say, their
practical understanding of the scope and limits of soli-
darity) for themselves. Some nations—for instance, The
Netherlands and Sweden—have held elaborate ethical in-
quiries into how to define the scope and limits of “the
solidarity community” for health care services. The up-
shot is that most services traditionally and currently cov-
ered pass muster, and that there is a limit to the time
and energy commissions are willing to spend debating
whether in vitro fertilization or Viagra respond to “so-
cial” or “merely personal” needs. All the same the relent-
less pace of medical innovation increasingly forces
pointed and poignant decisions about whether to ex-
clude new technologies with limited benefit according to
experts but “life saving” qualities in the eyes of patient
groups and the media. Such processes could fatally cor-
rode solidarity, but evidence from Israel indicates that
meticulous and consultative decision making by expert
bodies can reduce the risk of decisions that fail to give
solidarity its due [6].
Western systems, moreover, demarcate a special and
separate set of services that lie beyond the realm of
(what they take to be) medically necessary and appropri-
ate care and maintain complementary, supplementary,
or private coverage regimes that, for example, allow a
patient faster access to a specialist (England), reimburse
a patient for some copayments (France), and pick up the
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general these systems seem to accept that a flexible ceil-
ing on services is consistent with solidarity so long as
the floor (access of all to medically necessary and appro-
priate services) is secure, but in many, the demands of
solidarity are a topic of lively debate. For example, Cana-
dians have long frowned on enabling citizens to buy pri-
vate coverage that permits them to jump the queue for
care, but they may be changing their collective (anyway
judicial) mind on the matter. Worried that less advan-
taged citizens had trouble affording the complementary
coverage enjoyed by the better off, France in 2000 made
complementary coverage universal and now debates how
best to limit the financial burdens of eye care, dental ser-
vices, and prosthetics for citizens on public assistance
[7]. Moreover, troubled that the state’s heavier reliance
on the complementary sector may have disparate effects
across the full range of insured citizens, France is con-
sidering whether public regulation should introduce
more uniformity into a sector in which market forces
have heretofore enjoyed fairly free play.
In Israel, supplementary insurance is subject to guar-
anteed issue requirements, is community rated by age,
and is held by nearly 80 % of the population. Its use by
some subscribers to expand their choice of physician,
and to jump the queue for consultations and surgeries in
private or quasi private settings, however, has challenged
solidarity. Proposals to expand this option to the nation’s
public hospitals are resisted by both the Israeli Ministry
of Finance (which fears an increase in spending in the
public hospital sector) and a recent blue ribbon panel
(which decried it as inequitable because supplementary
coverage, while widespread, is not universal).
In these cases one sees both the durability of the core
of solidarity and the productive “dialogical” role it plays
in health policy deliberations: all should be covered for
medically necessary and appropriate care, but the
boundaries of such care are porous and sometimes con-
tentious, so considerations of solidarity (universality, re-
distribution, and uniformity) should shape the rules of
the game that govern complementary coverage too.
Keeping solidarity in play does not chart detailed policy
paths but rather serves to italicize crucial questions, to
refine policymakers’ reflections on them, and to identify
policy making processes and institutional arrangements
that can make and implement decisions about the evolv-
ing roles of complementary insurance.
Saltman skillfully sketches the gains and losses in soli-
darity that have followed the move to regulated competi-
tion in the Netherlands in 2006, but he says little about
an important contextual part of the picture. The 20-odd
years between the arrival of regulated competition on
the Dutch health policy agenda in the mid 1980s and its
enactment in 2006 saw not only the search for asupportive political coalition but also endless tinkering
with a risk adjustment formula for paying health in-
surers, in order to forestall the preferred risk selection
that competition, absent such a feature, might unleash.
The formula was deemed crucial to ensuring that com-
petitive efficiencies did not come at the cost of solidarity,
which cannot abide the barriers that experience rating
throws in the path of universal coverage. The ups and
downs of solidarity that Saltman emphasizes, in short,
unfolded within a larger policy framework within which
the protection of solidarity was accepted by virtually all
policy protagonists as a top priority.
It is worth noting too that in most Western nations,
the challenges to solidarity that accompany estimations
of risk, adjustments of payments to insurers to account
for risks and tensions over limited provider networks do
not arise. Saltman’s vignettes feature three of the four
main Western national experiments (Switzerland is
number four) that seek efficiencies by encouraging com-
petition among sickness funds. Single payer systems
(Canada, England, Italy, Spain, and the Scandinavian na-
tions, for example) do not use sickness funds for basic
coverage, and some nations that do use them (France,
for instance) resist the seductions of market competition
in health coverage. Policymakers in these societies are
not unaware of the theoretical claims on behalf of com-
petition, but they resist them for many reasons, not the
least important being that it could damage if not destroy
solidarity.
Solidarity need not mean a principled disregard of the
risk profile of the citizens a universal system covers,
however. Germany, convinced that this concept entails
duties as well as rights, now permits sickness funds to
offer incentives for participation by their enrollees in
wellness programs, the rationale being that solidarity
obliges citizens to avoid needless illness and use of care
that wastes the system’s scarce resources [3]. In this case,
too, solidarity serves as an invitation to dialogue: do
these particularized incentives breach solidarity by intro-
ducing invidious distinctions among citizens and by add-
ing behavioral incentives to the calculation of their
contributions to the cost of their coverage, or do they
enhance it by helping to shore up a collective good,
namely, collective coverage? The question is debata-
ble—and perhaps unanswerable—but the importance of
collective endeavors to explicate it is undeniable.
The slow economic growth that has followed the Great
Recession of 2008 certainly portends “austerity” and per-
haps even “permanent retrenchment” for Western health
care systems, but these systems have been wrestling with
challenges comparable in kind if not in degree for de-
cades. Cut backs have mainly meant marginally slower
growth in health care spending which, as noted above,
cannot be said per se to violate solidarity, because the
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growth of health care spending slows. In single payer
systems, the main manifestation of these “cuts” has been
longer wait times to enter the system, and one would
need an accurate picture of their incidence across groups
and regions in order to gauge their effects on solidarity.
In Continental systems, proponents of solidarity among
policy elites in the public sector have since the 1980s
augmented their expertise and refined their arguments
in favor of a tenacious and strong state presence—a pos-
ition they have defended by incorporating new fiscal
constraints into their public policy agenda. In France,
for instance, elites within Social Security agencies “used
the argument of budgetary constraint to [their] advan-
tage and ensured the durability of the French welfare
model, that is, a sustainable Social Security.” In other
nations too, a strategic fusion of solidarity and sustain-
ability lets defenders of a strong state articulate “plaus-
ible public claims about helping democracies adapt to
changing economic and international environments” [8].
Saltman rightly remarks that “past practice clearly indi-
cates that governments can and regularly do change the
social contract that underlies health sector solidarity”
and that further changes will not necessarily reflect a
breach of stewardship [1]. Nevertheless European na-
tions continue to look much more like each other than
they look like the United States, where policymakers
shun the term “solidarity” in principle, admit it into
practice solely for the aged and for veterans, and (not-
withstanding some steps toward standardization under
the Affordable Care Act of 2009) largely entrust consid-
erations of universality, redistribution, and uniformity to
the whims of employers and the 50 states. The difference
is that in Europe, unlike the US, the variations on which
Saltman chooses to focus play out around a firm and (so
far) stable conceptual and normative core of solidarity
which pervades not only the substance of health policy,
in particular the cultural resolve that all citizens should
get the care that they need without financial barriers,
but also the processes created to determine the limits
to what patients and citizens can expect to be able
to access.
Many of the best technical tools for making such deci-
sions – for instance, health technology assessment, cost-
effectiveness analysis, and evidence based medicine – have
US origins, but absent firm underpinnings of solidarity
their effects have been limited, and sometimes, by trig-
gering hysteria over alleged rationing of care by federal
bureaucrats, even perverse . Allegiance and attention to
the core value of solidarity, and the commitment to
explore its practical meaning in shifting strategic con-
texts enable European systems to apply these tools in
ways that are (or anyway aim to be) both principled
and pragmatic.Conclusion
Saltman’s caution that shrill voices on the Left should
not be allowed to invoke solidarity as an all purpose
antidote to efficiency and sober-minded budgeting is
useful. We would think it unfortunate, however, if his
caveats fortified forces on the Right who would dismiss
solidarity as a metaphysical chimera and a luxury Western
health care systems can no longer afford.
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